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I. Introduction  
 
 European Welfare States are characterized by dual labor markets. Unskilled 
workers are typically unionized, while skilled workers often negotiate on their wages 
individually, and, thus, face more competitive wage formation. Historically, labor 
unions have been able to push for relatively high wages of unskilled workers, at the 
cost of a higher unemployment in Continental Europe than in the United States.  
During the late 20th century and after that globalization has put the European welfare 
model under increasing pressure. Wage differences across countries constitute a 
central explanation for the increasing dominant business practice of international 
outsourcing across a wide range of industries (see e.g. Sinn (2007) for an overview 
and Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing).  
Outsourcing can take two alternative forms. Firms may write long-term 
contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage, i.e. 
strategic outsourcing, or alternatively firms may be flexible enough to decide upon 
the amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously with domestic labor demand after 
the domestic wage is set by the trade union. 
While there is a large literature on international outsourcing, only a few 
contributions have studied the various effects of wage taxation in its presence. 
Koskela and Schöb (2010) analyze in the case of monopoly trade union the impacts 
of labor tax policy reforms in the presence of both strategic and flexible outsourcing 
when domestic labor is homogeneous. This paper opens a new research theme by 
analyzing the effects of wage taxation with flexible international outsourcing when 
the domestic labor market is heterogeneous so that labor markets are imperfectly 
competitive in the case of low-skilled workers when monopoly labor union decides 
the wage rate of low-skilled workers, and perfectly competitive in the case of high-
skilled workers so that the high-skilled wage adjust to equalize labor demand and 
labor supply by also assuming CES-utility function which depends on the elasticity 
of substitution between consumption and leisure for high-skilled workers. I assume 
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for simplicity that there is the representative firm to allow for different labor market 
situation.1 
I find that in the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of high-
skilled workers´ CES-utility function in competitive labor market equilibrium  (a) the 
high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage, whereas (b)  the high-
skilled wage depends positively (negatively) on the wage tax when the elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one, whereas (c) 
the high-skilled wage depends negatively (positively) on the tax exemption when the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one. 
In the case of high- skilled workers´ CES-utility function in competitive labor market 
equilibrium higher outsourcing wage and higher outsourcing cost will increase the 
wage for the low-skilled labor because the wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor 
will decrease and these will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor. 
A higher unskilled wage tax rate will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labor and the higher unskilled wage tax 
exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor and will increase the 
wage for the high-skilled labor. In terms of labor tax reform (a) a higher degree of 
tax progression by raising the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled 
workers to keep the relative burden per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the 
wage rate and increase labor demand of low-skilled workers, whereas (b) it will 
decrease (increase) employment of high-skilled workers in CES utility function when 
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than 
one,  (c) A higher low-skilled wage tax rate will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labor and decrease the wage for high-skilled labor and the higher low-skilled wage 
tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor and will increase the 
wage for the high-skilled labor. Similar qualitative but not quantitative effects arise 
also in the absence of outsourcing.  
                                                  
1       Other research topic is to focus the role of heterogeneous firms to study the interaction between 
wage bargaining and foreign direct investment (see e.g. Eckel and Egger (2900) about this 
analysis but in the absence of labor market policy reforms). 
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Finally, a higher degree of wage tax progression for the high-skilled worker, 
keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker constant, will have no effect 
on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES - utility function. Because there are 
no effect of high-skilled wage tax progression on high-skilled and low-skilled wage 
in the case of different tax parameters compared with low-skilled workers, there is no 
employment effects in this case. 
Section II presents the time sequence of the decisions regarding some policy 
issues associated with labor taxes, wage setting for domestic low-skilled workers, 
labor demand for domestic high-skilled and low-skilled workers, outsourcing and 
wage setting for skilled workers. It is studied the segmented domestic labor demand 
for heterogeneous work force and outsourcing decision and wage formation of high-
skilled workers due to market equilibrium under labor taxation in section III. Wage 
formation by the monopoly labor union for low-skilled workers under a linearly 
progressive wage tax levied on workers is analyzed in section IV. In section V it is 
studied the impacts of both low-skilled skilled wage progression and high-skilled 
wage progression on wage setting and employment of both types of workers. Finally, 
it is summarized conclusions in section VI.    
 
 
II.      Basic Framework 
 
It is analyze a model with heterogeneous domestic workers and international 
outsourcing. The production combines labor services by high-skilled workers and 
low-skilled workers. Low-skilled labor services can be provided either by the firm’s 
own workers, or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing. It is 
assumed that the firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of 
outsourcing activity only after the wage is set by the labor union. Skaksen (2004) has 
analyzed the implications of outsourcing for wage setting and employment under 
imperfectly competitive labor markets in terms of both potential (non-realized) and 
realized international outsourcing. Also he analyzes flexible outsourcing, but in 
homogenous domestic labor markets. The time sequence for this case is described by 
Figure 1.   
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                stage 1              stage 2                            stage 3                                                                             
                                                                                                      time 
 
 
 
            tax policy         wage formation of     high-skilled and low-skilled labor 
            decisions          low-skilled wage       demand, outsourcing, and high-skilled  
                                                          labor supply & high-skilled wage 
                                                 
 Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
 
The government sets its policy at stage 1. At stage 2 conditional on policy choices by 
the government, the labor union determines the wage for the low-skilled workers by 
taking into account how this affects the demand for labor and outsourcing by the 
firms. At stage 3, firms decide on domestic employment and international 
outsourcing. The wages of the high-skilled labor adjust to equalize labor demand and 
labor supply. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction.  
 
 
III.     Labor Demand, Outsourcing Decision and High-Skilled Wage    
Formation 
 
III.1.  High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labor Demand and Outsourcing 
 
At  the last  stage,  the firm decides on the high-skilled labor demand H , the 
low-skilled labor demand L  and outsourcing M in order to maximize the profit 
function 
 
        )(),,(
),,(
MgMwLwHwMLHFMax MLH
MLH
?????????                                 (1) 
 
where  Lw  is the wage for low-skilled labor,  Hw  is the wage for high-skilled labor, 
and Mw wage of outsourcing. It is assumed that while some activities are easy to 
outsource, some other activities are more costly to outsource. Therefore, the marginal 
cost of outsourcing increases in the scope of activities to outsource. To capture this 
effect we model the acquisition of M  units of the outsourced low-skilled labor input 
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to require an irreversible investment 25,0)( cMMg ?  with 0)(' ?? cMMg  and 
0)('' ?? cMg . This captures the idea that firms make irreversible investment in the 
establishment of networks of suppliers in the relevant low-wage countries. 
 
I follow Koskela and Stenbacka (2010) by assuming a Cobb-Douglas-type 
production function with decreasing returns to scale with three labor inputs, i.e.   
? ??? aa MLHMLHF ??? 1)(),,( , where the parameters ?  and a  are assumed to 
satisfy: 10 ?? ?  and 1
2
1 ?? a .2 This latter specification means that the marginal 
productivity of the high-skilled labor is higher than that of the low-skilled labor. The 
parameter 0??  captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labor input 
relative to the domestic low-skilled labor input. The marginal products of high-
skilled labor, low-skilled labor and outsourcing are: 
HaFMLaHFF aaH /)(
111 ??? ? ??? ??? , )/()1( MLFaFL ?? ??? ,and LM FF ?? . 
The outsourced low-skilled labor input affects the marginal products of the domestic 
high-skilled and low-skilled labor inputs as follows  
 
0
)(
)1(2 ??
??? F
MLH
aaFF HLHM ?
???  and ? ? 0)1(1
)(
)1(
2 ????
??? aF
ML
aFLM ??
?? .  
 
Thus, for this production function the domestic high-skilled labor input and the 
outsourced labor input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic labor 
input and the outsourced labor input are substitutes in terms of the marginal product 
effects of outsourcing. Also one can calculate from the production function that the 
domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labors are complements, i.e. 0?HLF . Given 
the wages, the outsourcing cost function first-order conditions characterizing the 
domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labor demands and outsourcing are  
                                                  
2       Ethier (2005) has introduced a partly related Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, 
where domestic low-skilled labor and outsourcing are substitutes and domestic high-skilled 
labor and outsourcing are complements, to analyze the decision between international 
outsourcing and in-house production in the analysis of the effect of globalization on the skill 
premium.    
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                                0??? HH wFH
a?? ,                                                  (2a) 
 
                                0
)(
)1( ???
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?
?? ,                                                   (2b) 
 
                                0
)(
)1( ????
?? cMwF
ML
a
MM ?
??? .                                          (2c)  
 
These first-order conditions (2a) and (2b) imply the following relationship between 
the high-skilled labor ( H ) and the low-skilled labor inclusive of outsourcing 
( )ML ??  
)(
1
ML
a
a
w
wH
H
L ???? .                                              (3) 
 
Using (2b) and (2c) we have  
 
                                        
c
wwM ML )(* ?? ?                                                              (4) 
 
where 0, ** ??MM Lw , and 0,
** ?
Mwc
MM . According to (4) the higher low-skilled 
domestic wage rate, and the higher productivity of outsourced labor input will 
increase outsourcing, while the higher outsourcing wage and the higher outsource 
cost will decrease flexible outsourcing. In the case of production function 
? ??? aa MLHMLHF ??? 1)(),,(  outsourcing elasticities have the following 
findings: 1
)( **
*
*
*
?????? cM
w
ww
w
M
M
M
wM
L
ML
Lf
M
LLw ll ?
?
???? , 1*
*
??
M
cM c  and 
1
)( *ˆ*
*
?????? cM
w
ww
w
M
wM M
ML
Mf
M
MwM
?? . The elasticities with respect to low-skilled 
wage, productivity of outsourced labor input, and outsourcing wage in the presence 
of outsourcing are higher than one. Higher low-skilled wage will decrease these 
elasticities, i.e. 0
)( 2
?????
?
ML
M
L
f
M
ww
w
w ?
??  and higher outsourcing wage will increase 
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these wage elasticities, i.e. 0
)( 2
????
?
ML
L
M
f
M
ww
w
w ?
?? . Substituting the RHS of (3) for 
H  into (2b) Laa wMLHa ??? ?? 1)1()()1( ?? ??  gives  
L
aa
H
L wML
a
a
w
wa 11)()
1
())(1( ?? ???? ??
???  so that the low-skilled labor demand can be 
expressed as  
 
         ?
?
??
?
? ????? ????
c
wwwmwMwmwL MLHLHL
L
H
L
L
L
H
L
L
??? ???? **  ,                                 (5) 
 
where ? ? 0)1( 1 11 ??? ?? ???? aa aam , 1
1
1 ??
?? ?
?? aLL  and 01 ??? ?
?? aLH . These are 
higher with decreasing returns to scale. According to (5), a more extensive 
outsourcing activity due to a lower outsourcing cost Mw will decrease the low-skilled 
labor demand, which lies in conformity with empirical evidence.3 Moreover, higher 
outsourcing wage will increase the low-skilled labor demand, i.e. 0* ??
c
LM
? . In the 
presence of outsourcing the wage elasticities of the low-skilled labor, 
0
*
*
?
?
M
Lw
L
wL
L  
and 
0
*
*
?
?
M
Hw
L
wL
H , can be written as follows  
 
  ))1(()(1 **
*
**
*
c
wM
Lc
wM
LL
M ML
L
L
L
ML
L
f
L ?????????
?
???
? ?? ??????? ,                       (6a)    
 
where 
c
w
c
wM LM ???*  and    
                      ???
?
???
? ?? *
*
1
L
ML
H
f
H ??? .                                                                           (6b) 
 
                                                  
3       For instance, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level data of the Irish electronic sector to 
empirically conclude that international outsourcing reduces plant-level labor demand.    
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The higher is outsourcing due to various parameter changes, we then have the 
following effects 
0)1)(1()1( **
*
*2*
*
2*
***
* ????
?
???
? ???????
?
??
? ????
?
cL
w
L
M
LcL
Lw
L
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L
f
L ????????  and 
0)1( *
*
*2*
***
* ?????
?
??
? ???
?
L
M
LL
LML
M
L
H
ML
H
f
H ?????? .  These  are  in  conformity  with  
empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage 
elasticities of low-skilled domestic labor demand.4 Also one can show that higher 
outsourcing productivity will increase the wage elasticities, i.e. 0??
?
?
? fL .   
The higher outsourcing cost and outsourcing wage will decrease the own 
wage elasticity of low-skilled labor  
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w
L
LMML
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and  
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and it will also have the same qualitative effects on the cross wage elasticity of low-
skilled labor, i.e.  
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4        Slaughter (2001) and Hasan et al. (2007) have shown in empirics that international trade has 
increased the wage elasticity of labor demand. 
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Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (5) into the relationship between H  
and ML ?? in equation (3) by using the production function 
? ??? aa MLHMLHF ??? 1)(),,(  gives the following demand for the high-skilled 
labor 
 
                
H
L
H
H
LH wwa
maH ?? ???? 1
* ,                                                                        (8) 
 
where 1
1
)1(1
*
*
??
????? ?
?? a
H
wH HwH
H
H , and 0
1
)1(
*
*
??
???? ?
?? a
H
wH LwH
L
L . These 
elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale, but in this model 
unlike in the case with the low-skilled labor, both the own wage and cross wage labor 
demand elasticities are independent of outsourcing. The higher own wage, and cross 
wage will of course affect negatively the high-skilled labor demand.  
We can now summarize these findings regarding the properties of the 
domestic labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 In the presence of flexible outsourcing  
(a) the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the low-
skilled labor demand depend negatively on the outsourcing wage and 
outsourcing cost, whereas   
(b) both the own wage and the cross wage elasticities for the high-skilled 
labor demand are directly independent of the  outsourcing  wage and 
outsourcing cost.  
 
 
III.2.   Wage Formation for High-Skilled Workers  
 
III.2.1. Optimal Labor Supply of High-Skilled Workers 
 
I assume for simplicity that the market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage 
Hw  follows from the equality of labor demand and labor supply in the case of CES 
utility function for high-skilled worker. First it is derived labor supply and after that 
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wage formation from market equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage Lw  as 
given.  
It is assumed that the government can employ the proportional wage tax Ht  
for skilled worker, which is levied on the wage rate Hw  minus tax exemption He . 
Thus the total tax base in this case is Hew HH )( ? , where H  is labor supply. In the 
presence of positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage 
tax rate )/1( HHH wet ?  so that the system is linearly progressive.5 The net-of-tax 
wage, the skilled worker receives, is HHHHH etwtw ??? )1(ˆ . 
Labor supply of the high-skilled worker H is determined by utility 
maximization s.t. CHwH ?ˆ . Using the static CES utility function in terms of 
consumption C  and leisure H?1  the labor supply by the high-skilled worker is 
determined by maximizing 
  
111-
)1)(1()(),(
??
?
?
?
?
?
? ????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?? HCHCu   s.t. CHwH ?ˆ ,                               (9) 
 
where 10 ??? , and ?  describes the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure. By using the notation ?
?
?
?
??
11
)1)(1()ˆ(
??
???? HHwZ H  the first-order 
condition for labor supply can be expressed as follows 
 
           0)1)(1(ˆ)ˆ(),(
11
1
1
??
?
?
?
?
? ???? ??? ??? ?? HwHwZHCu HHH ,                             (10) 
 
so that we have the following labor supply  
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H
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5     For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another 
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).     
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The effects of the wage Hw , wage tax 10 ?? Ht and tax exemption 0?He  on the 
optimal labor supply are  in this case the following    
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Therefore higher wage rate and tax exemption will increase (decrease) labor supply 
of high-skilled worker if the elasticity of substitution ?  between consumption C  and 
leisure H?1  is higher (smaller) than one, while higher wage tax will decrease 
(increase) labor supply of high-skilled worker if the elasticity of substitution ?  
between consumption C  and leisure H?1  is higher (smaller) than one. In the case 
of Cobb-Douglas utility function with 1??  labor supply does not depend on wage 
rate, Hw , wage tax Ht and tax exemption e  because ?
?
?? ?
??
?
??
? ??
?
?
)1(1
1
1
sH . 
 
III.2.2. Market Equilibrium and Comparative Statics for High-Skilled Wage  
Formation   
 
Unlike in the case of low-skilled workers we assume that the high-skilled 
wage Hw  is determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the 
labor demand function and the labor supply function. Now equality of demand, 
equation (8), and supply of labor, equation (11),  sHH ?*  gives   
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which can be expressed implicitly in terms of high-skilled and low-skilled wages as   
                                                                                                     
      
H
L
H
H
H
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Under 1??  equation (14) can be written explicitly as  HH
H
L
H
H
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aw ?
?
?? ??
??
?
??
? ??
1
)1( . 
The relationship from the implicit function (14) between the changes in the high-
skilled wage Hw  and  the  low-skilled  wage  Lw  is the following one 
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H
LHHHHHH
H
HH
H
H dwwma
adwtwwwww
H
L
H
H
H
H
H
H 1111 )1())1(ˆ)1(ˆ()1( ???????? ????
?
??
? ??????? ??????? ????
??
 
where  
 
? ? 0ˆ))1)(1()1(
))1(ˆ)1(ˆ()1(
1
1111
??????
?????
?
??
? ???????
???
?????????
???
???????
????
?
????
??
HHHH
H
H
H
HH
H
H
HHHHHH
H
HH
H
H
wwewtt
wtwwwww
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
   
because 0
1
1 ??????? ?
??? aLHHH  so that 01 ??? ?? HH . This can now be expressed 
as  
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In this more general CES utility function case there is a negative relationship 
between the high-skilled wage and the low-skilled wage, which comes via the high-
skilled labor demand, where the low-skilled wage have a negative effect on the high-
skilled labor demand due to complementary of H  and L  in terms of production. 
This implies that higher outsourcing concerning domestic labor input will increase 
the wage rate of high-skilled workers because it decreases the wage rate of low-
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skilled-workers, which lies in conformity with empirics. It has been empirically 
shown that higher outsourcing will decrease wage formation of low-skilled workers 
and increase wage formation of high-skilled workers, i.e. that wage dispersion will 
increase.6   
The relationship from the implicit function (14) between the changes in the 
high-skilled wage Hw  and tax parameters are as follows 
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According to these calculations, higher wage tax and lower tax exemption will 
increase (decrease) the high-skilled wage if the elasticity of substitution ?  between 
consumption C  and leisure H?1  is higher (smaller) than one, because under these 
conditions labor supply decreases (increases) (see equations (12b-c for details). In the 
case of 1?? there is no effect of tax parameters on the high-skilled workers.  
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the high-
skilled wage determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
                                                  
6        See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel 
(2007), Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Hijzen et al (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger and Egger 
(2006),  Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008). 
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Proposition 2 In the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of 
high -skilled workers´ CES-utility function in competitive labor market 
equilibrium    
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage,  
whereas    
(b)  the high-skilled wage depends positively (negatively) on the wage tax 
when the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
is higher (lower ) than one, whereas  
(c) the high-skilled wage depends negatively (positively) on the tax 
exemption  when the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure is higher (lower) than one, while the high-skilled wage is 
independent of tax parameters when the elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure is one.   
 
 
IV. Wage Formation by Monopoly Labor Union for Low-Skilled 
Workers 
 
Now it is analyzed the wage formation of low-skilled workers so that it takes 
place in anticipation of optimal labor and outsourcing decisions by the firm by 
focusing the wage formation by the monopoly labor union (see also Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004), p. 401 - 403 concerning the monopoly union specification), 
which determines the wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-
house low-skilled labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing determined 
simultaneously and of market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw .   
 
IV.1.  Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labor Union 
 
The market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw  follows  from  the  
equality of labor demand and the labor supply by focusing the case of a CES utility 
function, presented in Section III. The monopoly labor union determines the wage for 
low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal domestic labor demands and high-
skilled wage and outsourcing decisions by the firm. I assume that government can 
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employ a proportional tax rate Lt , which is levied on the wage rate Lw  minus a tax 
exemption Le ,  i.e.  the total  tax base is  
*)( Lew LL? . In the presence of a positive tax 
exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate )/1( LLL wet ?  so 
that the system is linearly progressive and the net-of-tax wage is 
LLLLL etwtw ??? )1(ˆ .  The  labour  tax  systems  in  all  the  OECD  countries  are  
progressive and show significant differences in the degree of tax progression.7 
The objective function of the labor union is assumed to be 
NbLbwNbLbetwtV LLLLLLLLL ???????? ** )ˆ())1(( , where Lb  is the (exogenous) 
outside option available to the unskilled workers and N is the number of labor union 
members. The monopoly labor union sets wage for the unskilled workers so as to 
maximize the surplus according to  
 
       ? NbLbwV LLL
wL
??? *
)(
)ˆ(max                                                                               (16)  
       s.t. ?
?
??
?
? ????? ????
c
wwwmwMwmwL MLHLHL
L
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L
H
L
L
??? ???? **  and    sHH ?*                     
 
where the high-skilled labor demand is 
H
L
H
H
LH wwa
maH ?? ???? 1
*  and the high-skilled 
labor  supply  is  
??
?
??
? ??
?
???
?
? 1)()1(1
1
H
s
w
H , so that sHH ?*  implies 
H
L
H
H
H
H
LHHH wma
awww ????? ?
? )1(ˆ)1( 1 ???? ???  (see equations (8), (11) and (14)). The first-
order condition associated with (16) can be written as (see Appendix A)    
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where in the case of CES-utility function  
? ?
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7          Source: OECD (2004). 
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and 0
1
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?
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H
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L
H
L
L
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w
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dw
dw
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?
. Using the equation (14) these can be re-expressed as 
follows 
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and                                                                                                                          (18a)                                                                         
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where 0ˆ)1(1 1 ???? ????
?
HwT  and 0))1((ˆ)
1(1 ?????? ? ??
? ??
HHHHH twetwU . 
Using (18a-b) in equation (17) can be presented implicitly as follows in the case of 
CES-utility functions (see Appendix A) 
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where 
L
LLL
L t
etbb ?
??
1
ˆ . The own wage and cross wage elasticities of low-skilled labor 
demand are )1 **
*
*
*
cL
w
L
M
L
M ML
L
f
L ????? ?????
?
???
? ??  and ???
?
???
? ?? *
*
1
L
ML
H
f
H ???  (see 
equations (6a-6b)). These low-skilled labor demand elasticities are not constant 
because the low-skilled labor demand, 
?
?
??
?
? ????? ????
c
wwwmwMwmwL MLHLHL
L
H
L
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L
H
L
L
??? ???? **  depends negatively in the 
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nonlinear way on the following variables: the high-skilled wage, the low-skilled 
wage, outsourcing wage and outsourcing cost and the productivity of the outsourced 
labor input relative to the domestic low-skilled labor input.    
The optimal low-skilled wage (19a-b) also the case of the monopoly labor 
union is an implicit form in the presence of outsourcing, because the mark-up 
?
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 depends on the low-skilled wage rate in a non-linear way 
so that it cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic low-skilled wage.  
Equations (19a-b)) can be expressed as  
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where )()1)(( ***
*
c
wM
LL
M
U
T M
H
H
H
L
L
HL
L
f
L ?????
???
????  and in the presence of 1??  we 
have the following form for low-skilled wage )()1( ***
*
1 c
wM
LL
M Mf
L ?????
????
?
 and 
1
)1(1
1 ???? a?? . 
 
 
IV.2.  Comparative Statics of Low-Skilled Wage Formation  
 
In order to characterize the effect of parameters on the unskilled monopoly 
trade wage formation it is applied the implicit differentiation. In terms of 
comparative statics of the outside option for unemployment benefit we have from the 
implicit wage formation (20a) the following result 
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so that by using ffLL wb ?? /)1(ˆ * ?? this can be expressed as  
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1?f? . According to (22) the effect of outside option on low-skilled wage formation 
is qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing because the mark-up in the 
presence of CES utility function is 
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. In the presence of 1?? without outsourcing the mark-up is 
?
?
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?
?
???? 11,0 ?
?
?MA  so that 0ˆ 1,0
1,0
*
?? ??
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?
?
M
ML
L A
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dw .8  
Differentiating  the  implicit  wage  formation  (20a)  with  respect  to  the  low-
skilled wage and the outsourcing wage gives  
 
                                                  
8      Of course, in the absence of outsourcing the mark-up between outside option and wage 
formation 1
00
?? ?? MM AA  is higher than in the presence of outsourcing.  
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 which can be expressed by using  ffLL wb ?? /)1(ˆ * ?? as follows   
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and  0??
?
L
f
L
w
? . These results are qualitative similar in the case of 1?? when 
.1)1( ??
??? ????
U
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L                                                                                                   
Also the effects of higher outsourcing cost are qualitatively similar, i,e.   
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  as 0??
?
c
f
L?  (equation (7a))  and  equation (15a) 
implies  0
*
?
dc
dwH            
In terms of comparative statics of the unskilled wage tax and the tax 
exemption we have the following results  
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According to (26a-26b) the effects of wage tax and tax exemption on low-skilled 
wage formation are qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing because 
0
)1()1( 2
0
*
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??? L
LL
ML
L
t
eb
dt
dw
?
?  and .0
)1()1(
0
*
?????? L
L
ML
L
t
t
de
dw
?
? This is because 
these parameters do not affect the mark-up of wage formation, but have an effect 
only via the outside mark-up. Of course, in the absence of outsourcing the mark-up 
between outside option and wage formation 1
)1(
1
10
?????? aA M ??
?  is higher 
than in the presence of outsourcing. Moreover, the equations (26a-26b) imply jointly 
with equation (15a) that ,0?
L
H
dt
dw  and 0?
L
H
de
dw   so that the higher wage tax and the 
higher outside option of unskilled workers will decrease the wage for the skilled 
labor, while the higher tax exemption of low-skilled workers will increase the wage 
for the skilled labor. 
                               
We can now summarize these findings in terms of the low-skilled wage 
formation in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 3 In the presence of flexible outsourcing in the case of high- 
skilled workers´ CES utility function in competitive labor market 
equilibrium 
(a) the higher outside option will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labor and therefore decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor and 
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these qualitative results are also qualitatively similar but higher in 
the absence of outsourcing, and  
(b)  the higher outsourcing wage and the higher outsourcing cost will 
increase the wage for the low-skilled labor because the wage 
elasticity of the low-skilled labor will decrease and these will 
decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor. 
 
 
V.    Effects of Labor Tax Policy Under Imperfectly and Perfective 
Competitive Domestic Labor Markets 
 
Next it is analyzed the effect of labor wage tax progression on wage 
formation and employment by the low-skilled workers and the high-skilled workers 
in domestic labor.   
 
V.1.     Effects of low-skilled wage tax progression on wage and employment  
 
I assume that the tax reform will keep the relative tax burden per low-skilled 
worker,  ),( LLL ewt ? constant, which means 
                        .R
w
ett
L
LL
L ??                                                                                     (27) 
The government can raise the degree of wage tax progression by increasing Lt  and 
Le  and allowing change in Lw under the condition 0?dR .9 Formally we have  
 
                     0
*
*
*
*
*
,0
?
???
?
???
?
?
??
???
?
???
?
?
???
?
?
L
L
L
LL
L
L
L
L
LL
LL
dRL
L
e
w
w
ett
t
w
w
etew
dt
de .                                                 (28) 
 
                                                  
9        A way to define tax progression is  to look at  the average tax progression ARP( ), which is 
given by the difference between the marginal tax rate Lt and the average tax rate R ,  
.RtARP L?  Tax system is progressive if ARP is positive and the progression is increases if 
the difference increases.   
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Concerning  the  low-skilled  wage  effect  of  this  reform  we  have 
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Dividing by Ldt  and substituting the RHS of (28) for 
Ldtde /   gives  (see Appendix B) 
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so that a higher degree of wage tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per 
low-skilled worker constant, will decrease the low-skilled wage rate. In the absence 
of outsourcing the qualitative effect is similar, i.e. 0
0,0
*
?
?? dMdRL
L
dt
dw , but it is 
quantitatively different (see Appendix B). 
Finally, it is characterized the unskilled employment effect by raising tax 
progression keeping the relative tax burden per unskilled worker constant to increase 
Lt  and e  according to (28), so that we have the following employment effect 
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so that higher degree of wage tax progression keeping the relative tax burden per 
low-skilled worker constant, will increase the low-skilled labor demand. These 
results (29) and (30) also happen qualitatively in a similar way in the case of 
homogeneous domestic labor markets with outsourcing (see Koskela and Schöb 
(2010)). The qualitative effect is also similar in the absence of outsourcing because 
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the higher degree of tax progression does not affect the mark-up of wage formation 
which depends on the presence and absence of outsourcing.10  
The total effect concerning direct and indirect effects of changes in low-
skilled wage on the skilled labor demand is in the case of CES utility function of 
high-skilled workers as follows  
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We can now summarize these findings in terms of the low-skilled wage 
formation and labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
     
Proposition 4 In the presence of flexible outsourcing  
(a) a higher degree of tax progression by raising the wage tax and the 
tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative burden 
per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the wage rate and 
increase labor demand of low-skilled workers, whereas  
         (b)   it will decrease (increase) employment of high-skilled workers in 
CES utility function when the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one,  while it will 
have no effect on employment of high-skilled workers in  the  case of 
the elasticity of substitution being one and  
(c)   qualitatively similar effects arise in the absence of outsourcing.   
 
 
V.2.     Effects of high-skilled wage tax progression on wage and employment 
 
                                                  
10       This has been analyzed in the absence of outsourcing under imperfectly competitive 
homogeneous domestic labor markets e.g. in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and in Koskela and 
Schöb (2002).   
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I assume that the tax reform will keep the relative tax burden per high-skilled 
worker,  ),( ewt HH ? constant, which means 
                        .H
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ett ??                                                                                (32) 
The government can raise the degree of wage tax progression by increasing Ht  and 
He  and allowing change in Hw under the condition 0?HdR . Formally we have  
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Concerning the high-skilled wage effect of this reform we have 
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Dividing by Hdt  and substituting the RHS of (33) for 
HH dtde /   gives    
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because the numerator is zero (see Appendix C) so that a higher degree of wage tax  
progression, keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker constant, will 
have no effect on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES utility function. 
Because there are no effect of high-skilled wage tax progression on high-skilled and 
low-skilled wage in the case of different tax parameters compared with low-skilled 
workers, there is no employment effects in this case. 
We can now summarize these findings regarding the properties of the 
domestic labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 5 In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
(a) a higher degree of wage tax progression for the high-skilled worker , 
keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker constant, will 
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have no effect on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES utility 
function, and   
(b) this higher-degree of tax progression will have no employment  
effect.  
 
V.3.    Equilibrium Unemployment of Low-Skilled Workers  
 
  
It is now moved on to explore the determinants of equilibrium unemployment 
of unskilled workers in dual labor markets, when there is both unionized and 
competitive determination of wages in the home country. Consider a representative 
industry according to equation (19) the monopoly labor union sets the wages 
according to L
f
L bw ˆ
* ?? , for unskilled workers with the mark-up f? . Assume that 
all industries are identical and for that reason one can neglect industry-specific 
indices. In a general equilibrium context with labor mobility across identical 
industries, but no mobility across different labor market segments or professions, the 
endogenous outside option. By assuming that the taxation is linearly progressive both 
in the presence of getting employment in identical industries and in the case of not 
getting employment but unemployment benefit, which we specify as  
 
 
               ))1(())1()(1( LLLLLLLLL ettBuettwub ???????                                (35)                      
   
where u  denotes the unemployment rate, LB  denotes the unemployment benefit for 
workers of type i and iw  denotes the wage determined by the union for  workers  of 
type i.11 In line with the literature we restrict ourselves to a benefit-replacement ratio 
LL wBq /? , which is constant across the two labor market segments. Combining 
(19a) and (35) equation (35) can be expressed as  
                                                  
11      For a standard justification of this interpretation, see e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999) p. 3048-
3049 for a further discussion. Nickell, S. and R. Layard (1999): Labor Market Institutions and 
Economic Performance, in Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card (eds): Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Volume 3C, 3029-3084.  
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Under this assumption we have ** )1(
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etbb ????
??  and LfL bAw ˆ* ?  can 
be written in terms of endogenous outside option as ? ?*** )1( LLfL wquwAw ??? . In this 
case, the equilibrium unskilled unemployment can be presented as   
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A higher benefit-replacement ratio q  , which we assumed to be exogenous, will 
increase equilibrium unemployment. According to (28), in the presence of a constant 
benefit-replacement ratio */ LL wbq ? , the impact of outsourcing on equilibrium 
unemployment comes via the mark-up 
ML
MLA f ??
?
??
?? *
*
)1(
)( .   
According to (36) the equilibrium unemployment in each segment depends 
positively both on the benefit-replacement ratio ( q ) and on the wage mark-up in the 
labor market.12 By substituting the wage mark-ups from (19a) into (36) one can 
explicitly characterize the equilibrium unemployment among the low-skilled 
workers, given outsourcing. As mentioned earlier the mark-up of unskilled wage 
formation fA in the presence of perfectly competitive skilled labor market is higher than in 
                                                  
12  The unemployment rate satisfies 10 ?? u  if  and only if  fAq
1? , which it is assumed to 
hold throughout the analysis. In light of available data for 20 OECD countries Bassanini and 
Duval (2006) report the average benefit-replacement ratio to (q) be approximately 0.27 with 
country observations in the interval ? ?65.0,13.0 . The average benefit-replacement ratio in 
OECD countries has mainly increased from the 1960s (see e.g. Table 2 in Nickell et al. 
(2005)).See Bassanini, A. and R. Duval (2006): Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: 
Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions. OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No. 486, 2006 and Nickell, S., Nunziata, L. and W. Ochel (2005): Unemployment in the 
OECD Since the 1990s. What Do We Know?, Economic Journal, 115, 1-27. 
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the absence of the part of perfectly competitive labor market so that this heterogeneous labor 
market wage formation of the unskilled workers is higher than in the homogenous unskilled 
labor market. The monopoly union will increase the low-skilled wage and therefore it will 
decreases the skilled wage according to equation (15a) so that in the presence of  of partly 
perfectly competitive domestic labor market, the equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled 
workers is higher, ceteris paribus. 
In terms of outsourcing effect it gives 
?
0
)1(
1
2 ???
?
f
f
A
dM
dA
qdM
du                                                    
so that higher outsourcing will decrease the equilibrium unemployment of low-
skilled workers because outsourcing will have a negative effect of wage formation. 
Differentiating equation (36) in terms of wage tax Lt  gives via 
*
Lw  and M  
?
0
)1(
1
2 ???
?
f
L
f
L A
dt
dA
qdt
du   as LL eb ?                                                                         
so that the total effect of a higher wage tax on the wage of low-skilled workers is 
negative and thereby increases the wage elasticity and lowers the mark-up because of 
a lower labor demand. In terms of tax exemption Le  for low-skilled workers we have   
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1
2 ???
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f
L
f
L
L
A
de
dA
qde
du                                            
so that tax exemption in the presence of outsourcing will have a positive effect on 
equilibrium unemployment. This is because the total effect of a higher tax exemption 
on  the  wage  of  low-skilled  workers  is  positive  and,  thereby,  decreases  the  wage  
elasticity and raises the mark-up because of a higher labor demand and a decrease in 
outsourcing. 
Now the analysis concentrates on the effects of tax progression for wage 
formation  and  employment  by  looking  as  the  tax  reform  that  increases  tax  
progression while keeping the average tax burden per worker constant so that                                        
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equation (27) R
w
ett
L
LL
L ?? is constant. The average tax rate progression ( ARP ) is 
given by the difference between the marginal tax rate Lt  and the average tax rate 
a
Lt , 
a
LL ttARP ?? . The tax system is progressive if ARP  is positive and progression is 
increased if ARP  increases. Government raises the degree of tax progression by 
increasing Lt  and adjusts Le  upwards such that 
a
Lt  remains constant. In this analysis 
the fully-balanced public sector budget aspect is not considered, because only some 
sectors may engage outsourcing, but not the whole economy.  
First the analysis focuses the wage effect of this tax reform under Nash 
domestic wage bargaining. Differentiating (27) with respect to Lt , Le  and Lw  to keep 
it constant gives L
L
L
L
L
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t
ewde ??? )(  and the total wage effect is 
LLeLLtL dewdtwdw LL ?? .  Substituting  the  RHS of   L
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where 
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These findings can be summarized as   
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Proposition 6 When the benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and less than 
one and unemployment benefits are taxed as unskilled wages, a higher 
wage tax rate and a lower tax exemption will decrease equilibrium 
unemployment in the presence of outsourcing and the average tax burden 
per worker constant  so that R
w
ett
L
LL
L ?? is constant and higher low-
skilled tax progression will decrease unemployment.   
 
 
VI.     Conclusions   
 
Most western European countries are characterized by dual labor markets, in 
which wages of some workers are set by labor unions, while other wages are 
determined competitively. In this paper I have studied an economy in which 
unskilled workers form a monopoly labor union, while skilled workers are employed 
in competitive labour markets. I analyze how the presence of flexible outsourcing, 
which is decided after the unskilled wage is set by the monopoly labor union, affects 
such an economy. 
It has been shown in the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of 
high-skilled workers´ CES utility function and in the case of elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure being one in competitive labor market equilibrium  
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage,  whereas (b)  
the high-skilled wage depends positively (negatively) on the wage tax when the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one, 
whereas (c) the high-skilled wage depends negatively (positively) on the tax 
exemption  when the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
higher (lower) than one, while the high-skilled wage is independent of tax parameters 
under Cobb-Douglas utility function. Moreover both in the case of high- skilled 
workers´ CES utility function and the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure is one in competitive labor market equilibrium higher outsourcing wage 
and higher outsourcing cost will increase the wage for the low-skilled labor because 
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the wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor will decrease and they will decrease the 
wage for the high-skilled labor. 
A higher low-skilled wage tax rate will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and the higher low-skilled wage 
tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor and will increase the 
wage for the high-skilled labor. Similar qualitative effects arise in the absence of 
outsourcing. In terms of labor tax reform (a) a higher degree of tax progression by 
raising the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the 
relative burden per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the wage rate and 
increase labor demand of low-skilled workers, whereas (b) it will decrease (increase) 
employment of high-skilled workers in CES utility function when the elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one,  (c)  while it 
will have no effect on employment of high-skilled workers in  the  case of Cobb-
Douglas utility function of high-skilled workers. 
Finally, it has been shown that a higher degree of wage tax progression for 
the high-skilled worker, keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker 
constant, will have no effect on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES utility 
function independent of the elasticity of substitution between consumption and 
leisure. Because there are no effect of high-skilled wage tax progression on high-
skilled and low-skilled wage in the case of different tax parameters compared with 
low-skilled workers, there is no employment effects in this case. 
This framework suggests avenues for further research. I only focus on two new 
aspects. First, the resources that domestic firms spend on outsourcing will give rise to 
welfare effects in other countries. This suggests that uncoordinated policies might be 
inefficient from the perspective of society as a whole, and that outsourcing may 
provide an argument for policy coordination across countries. This has been studied 
by Aronsson and Sjögren (2004) in the absence of outsourcing. Second, it is also 
very useful to study what are the implications of optimal monetary policy under 
heterogeneous labor markets and outsourcing in the case of product market 
imperfections, whether due to monopolistic or oligopolistic competition.   
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Appendix A:  Optimal Low-skilled Wage Setting under Linearly 
Progressive Wage Taxation  
 
The first-order condition associated with ? LbwV LL
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In the case of the CES utility function we have  
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where 01 ??? ?? HH . Using (A3) and (A4) gives  
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Therefore, we have the low-skilled wage decided by the monopoly labor union in the 
presence of high-skilled workers’ CES-utility functions 
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Appendix B:  Tax Progression and Low-skilled Labor Demand 
Substituting the RHS of (28) into LLL
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which gives (29), where the denominator is positive. Concerning the numerator    
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Without outsourcing we have the same qualitative, but quantitatively different result,  
i.e. 
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Appendix C: Tax Progression and High-skilled Labor Demand 
 
Using equations (15b-15c) and express the denominators as 
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QED. 
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